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During the first week of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

These divergent actions exemplifies the central principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and conflict resolution—despite the fact that this aligns with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative stated this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Mixed Signals

This shift is consequential, but observers caution it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

Differing from his predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has developed with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Action

An analogous standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.